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Abstract
This paper presents a model of exchange rate determination in which the forward premium
anomaly emerges as the result of unanticipated central bank interventions in the foreign
exchange market. Deviations from uncovered interest parity (UIP) therefore represent
neither unexploited proﬁt opportunities nor compensation for bearing risk. In simulations,
the model generates a forward premium anomaly and matches several other notable
features of US-German data. Additional empirical support is obtained from an analysis of
Fed and Bundesbank interventions in the dollar—DM market where it is found that the
forward premium anomaly intensiﬁes during those times when a central bank intervenes.
Keywords: Forward premium anomaly, foreign exchange intervention.
1This paper was previously circulated under the title ‘Continuous Time Market Dynam-
ics, ARCH Eﬀects, and the Forward Premium Anomaly.’ We thank Kathryn Dominguez for
the Fed and Bundesbank intervention data. We have beneﬁt e df r o mc o m m e n t so nt h ee a r l i e r
draft by participants at the 2001 Econometric Society Summer Meetings, the 2001 Midwest
Econometrics Group Meetings, and seminar participants at the University of Notre Dame,
West Virginia University, University of Michigan, University of Kentucky, and Dartmouth
College.Introduction
This paper investigates an asset pricing anomaly in international ﬁnance known as the
forward premium anomaly. That is, the empirical ﬁnding that the forward premium
(or the interest rate diﬀerential) is negatively correlated with the future exchange rate
1 return. Although substantial research has been devoted to studying the forward pre-
mium anomaly, a satisfactory understanding of the phenomenon has remained elusive.
The approach taken in this paper is that the forward premium anomaly emerges as the
result of unanticipated central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market. De-
viations from uncovered interest parity (UIP) therefore represent neither unexploited
proﬁt opportunities nor compensation for bearing risk.
There are several reasons why this is a sensible line of inquiry. First, theories
of the risk premium fare poorly when confronted by the data. Empirical investiga-
tions of asset-pricing models that explain the anomaly in terms of a time-varying risk
premium typically ﬁnd that the covariance between the exchange rate return and con-
sumption growth (in intertemporal asset pricing models) or the market portfolio (as
in the CAPM) is insigniﬁcant and much too small to explain the data. Quasi-rational
theories such as those that emphasize noise trader risk may explain the forward pre-
mium anomaly but do not lend themselves toward straightforward identiﬁcation and
testing. Second, there is evidence that any proﬁts predicted by the forward premium
anomaly are not economically signiﬁcant. Here, we note that in studies of survey
expectations, that the median expectation from the survey implies a subjective risk
premium of zero so that either the implied proﬁt opportunities are ignored by traders,
the risk to return tradeoﬀ is suﬃciently unattractive to exploit, or that traders do not
perceive that the anomaly exists. Third, with the beneﬁt of larger data sets, there is
2 fragmentary econometric evidence that UIP holds at long horizons.
1The equivalence between the interest diﬀerential and the forward premium is derived from the
covered interest parity condition.
2There is an extensive literature that attempts to understand the deviations from UIP. En-
gel (1996), Froot and Thaler (1990), Hodrick (1987), and Lewis(1995) survey much of this literature.
The ﬁndings from survey expectations were ﬁrst established by Froot and Frankel (1989). More re-
cently, Mark and Wu (1998) and Jeanne and Rose (2002) have studied the role of noise-trader risk
in generating the forward premium anomaly. Chinn and Merideth (1998) and Alexius (2001) report
1The model we present begins with the continuous-time version of UIP, which is
a ﬁrst-order stochastic diﬀerential equation. The solution of this diﬀerential equa-
tion gives the log exchange rate as an exact and nonlinear function of the interest
diﬀerential. To this basic framework, we introduce Krugman (1992) style central
bank interventions which occur at the margins of an informal exchange rate band. If
market participants were fully rational and had common and credible knowledge of
the central bank’s intervention rule, then UIP would hold continuously and also in
discretized observations. But this seems an unrealistic description of the dollar-DM
market both in light of the forward premium anomaly and also because neither the
Fed nor the Bundesbank have announced exchange rate targets for the dollar—DM
rate. Instead, intervention plans are formulated in secret and conducted irregularly so
that the intervention rules or an exchange rate band while known to central banks, are
3 unknown to market participants. Thus, when an intervention does occur, it creates
an ephemeral but unexpected shift in the stochastic process that governs the interest
diﬀerential. UIP is violated only during these instants when market participants have
in mind the wrong stochastic process driving the interest diﬀerential. The time series
is then composed of a mixture of observations mostly drawn from the UIP urn and
some drawn from an urn where UIP does not hold. OLS regressions of the future
depreciation on the interest diﬀerential detects these violations by returning negative
slope coeﬃcient estimates.
Beyond the forward premium anomaly, another notable feature of the model is
that it generates volatility clustering in the exchange rate excess return in a way that
conforms to patterns found in the data. The continuous-time framework provides
a basis for the pervasive presence of autoregressive heteroskedastic (ARCH) eﬀects
in exchange rate returns data. The source of these ARCH eﬀects is that the inno-
vations to the equilibrium dynamics driving the instantaneous exchange rate return
fragmentary evidence that UIP holds over long horizons. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) ﬁnd that the
forward premium anomaly is conﬁned to G-7 economies and is absent in emerging market economies.
3Lewis (1995) proposes an alternative to the target zone framework by modeling interventions
to stabilize the exchange rate around a targeted level where the probability of intervention depends
upon and is increasing in the gap between the current exchange rate and the target value.
2depends on the interest diﬀerential so that variations over time in the size of the
diﬀerential either magnify or shrink the conditional volatility of the exchange rate
4 returns. Importantly, these ARCH eﬀects are preserved under discretization of the
continuous-time process to conform to the sampling intervals of the data. We also
show that from the discretization of the model the “big news” representation of Schot-
man et.al. (1997) can be obtained where the error in the regression of the exchange
rate return on the forward premium contains both additive and multiplicative terms.
We provide empirical support for the model along two dimensions. First, in sim-
ulations to assess its quantitative ability to match prominent features of the data,
the model receives support by generating a forward premium anomaly, by matching
the volatility of exchange rate returns and the interest diﬀerential (which diﬀer by
an order of magnitude), by generating conditional exchange rate volatility that in-
creases with the size of the interest diﬀerential, and by generating persistence in the
exchange rate and interest diﬀerential that corresponds roughly to that found in US-
German data. The second line of support comes from a direct examination of the role
of Fed and Bundesbank interventions in explaining the dollar—DM market and the
forward premium anomaly. This analysis ﬁnds that the data are broadly consistent
with two key predictions of the model—UIP works better in the absence of foreign
exchange intervention and is clearly violated in the direction of the forward premium
anomaly when there is intervention, and the likelihood of interventions increases with
the magnitude of the interest diﬀerential.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a
set of empirical regularities of the international ﬁnance data that we seek to under-
stand. Section 2 presents the model of exchange rate dynamics that we study. The
quantitative assessment of the model is carried out by means of set of simulation
experiments with parameter values set equal to their simulated method of moments
(SMM) estimates. Section 3 discusses SMM estimation of model’s parameters and
4The state dependence of the volatility in equilibrium returns is a common feature in general
equilibrium continuous time asset pricing e.g., Merton (1990). See also Den Haan and Spear (1998),
who present a theory in which volatility clustering in real interest rates are generated by business-
cycle dependent ﬁnancial market frictions.
3the results of the simulation experiments are reported in section 4. Further econo-
metric results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 oﬀers some concluding comments.
Derivations of analytical results presented in the text are contained in the appendix.
1 Features of the dollar-DM exchange rate and
euro deposit differentials
Table 1 presents a list of features of foreign exchange returns and euro currency de-
posit rates around which we organize our investigation. We let s be the log dollar t
price of the foreign currency and r be the corresponding 1-week “US—German” Eu- t
5 rocurrency rate diﬀerential. These are weekly observations of the spot exchange rate
and weekly Eurocurrency rates for the US and Germany. Observations from 1/2/76
through 12/27/85 are Friday closings reported in the Harris Bank Weekly Review.
Observations from 1/3/86 through 12/25/98 are Friday quotations from Datastream.
We ended the sample one year before Germany irrevocably ﬁxed the deutschemark
6 to the euro.
The table begins with some properties of the exchange rate return’s conditional
error distribution–the residuals from the regression of ∆s on r . The Lagrange t+1 t
multiplier test for ﬁrst-order ARCH is highly signiﬁcant, the skewness coeﬃcient sug-
gests that the error distribution is symmetric and the excess kurtosis coeﬃcient indi-
7 cates that the error distribution is heavy-tailed relative to the normal distribution.
5Interest rates are stated in percent per annum. To conform to this normalization, the log
exchange rates are multiplied by 5200.
6We found that the 1-week maturity Eurocurrency rates spiked upwards towards the end of
December for several years without corresponding upward spikes in Eurocurrency rates at either
the 30-day or 90-day maturities. The spikes occurred in December of 1980, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1989,
1990, 1991, 1994, 1996 and 1997 for the US and 1976, 1978, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985,
1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1996 for Germany. In addition, spikes occur in March 1978,
April 1980, February 1981, and April 1988 for Germany. These spikes evidently are real and not
data recording errors. We looked at the 1-week rates during a two-day window around those Fridays
in which the spikes occurred and found that rates on those days tended to be abnormally high as
well which suggests the presence of a “Christmas eﬀect” in 1-week Eurocurrency rates.
72 LM is TR from a regression of the squared residual regressed on its own lag and is distributed
2 as Â (1) under the hypothesis of no conditional heteroskedasticity. See p.664 of Hamilton (1994).
4Table 1: Features of Weekly Data—($/DM rate, US and German Euro deposit rates)
Exchange Rate






Volatility (∆s ) 79.063 t
o 1 -order autocorrelation 0.001
Interest Diﬀerential
Volatility 3.230
o 1 -autocorrelation 0.985
o 12 -autocorrelation 0.847
o 24 -autocorrelation 0.789
Joint Features
∆s = ® + ¯r + ²¯ -0.693 t+1 tt +1
t-ratio (¯ = 1) -2.024
GARCH(1,1) ± 0.080
2 h = ! + ±² + °h (ase) (0.014) t+1 t t
° 0.914
(ase) (0.035)
h = a + a |r | + va 432.300 t+1 0 1 tt 1
(asymptotic t-ratio) (8.327)
2 R 0.771
Notes: Log exchange rates multiplied by 5200. Interest rate diﬀerential in percent
per year.
5Variance ratio statistics, computed using exchange rate returns at horizons 2, 12,
and 24, provide a summary measure of the autocorrelation function and gauge the
persistence in the observations. These variance ratio statistics all lie near or above
8 1 which indicates the presence of a high degree of persistence in the exchange rate.
Exchange rate returns exhibit almost no serial correlation whereas the interest dif-
ferential is highly serially correlated. Exchange rate return volatility is an order of
magnitude greater than interest rate diﬀerential volatility.
The lower portion of the table documents the presence of the forward premium
anomaly in our sample. UIP predicts a unit slope coeﬃcient in the regression
∆s = ® + ¯r + ² , whereas the point estimate is negative and signiﬁcantly t+1 tt +1
less than 1. To take a closer look at the conditional volatility in exchange rate
22 excess returns, we ﬁt the GARCH(1,1) model E ² = h = ! + ±² + °h to tt t −1 t+1 t−1
the regression error. As can be seen, the coeﬃcient estimates of ± and ° are both
signiﬁcant at standard levels. The ﬁnal aspect of the data that the table addresses
is to explore the relationship between the exchange rate conditional variance and the
size of the interest diﬀerential. We estimate the relation h = a + a |r | + v and see t 01 tt
that the conditional variance increases with the absolute magnitude of the interest
9 diﬀerential |r |. t−1
To summarize, our focus is placed on i) the forward premium anomaly, ii) ARCH
eﬀects in conditional exchange rate returns, iii) a positive relationship between con-
ditional exchange rate volatility and the magnitude of the interest diﬀerential, iv) the
exchange rate return is 24 times more volatile than the interest diﬀerential, and
3 Let ¹ be the j−th central moment. Then the skewness coeﬃcient ¹= ¾, is zero if the distribution j 3
4 is symmetric. The coeﬃcient of excess kurtosis (¹= ¾) − 3, is zero if the distribution is Gaussian. 4
If the underlying distribution is fat-tailed (thin-tailed) relative to the Gaussian distribution, this
quantity will be positive (negative).
8The variance ratio statistic at horizon k,V R ( k), is the variance of the k-period change in the
log exchange rate relative to k times the variance of the one-period change.
9Whether the interest diﬀerential is I(1) or I(0) has been heavily tested by testing whether the
spot and forward exchange rates are cointegrated. Evans and Lewis (1995) cannot reject that
the interest diﬀerential is I(1) whereas Baillie and Bollerslev (1989), Choudhry (1999), Corbae et.
al. (1992), Hai et. al (1997), Luintel and Paudyal (1998), Wu and Chen (1998) and Zivot (2000) do
reject. Baillie and Bollerslev (1994) conclude that the interest diﬀerential has long-memory but is
mean reverting with a fractional diﬀerence parameter between 1/2 and 1.
6iv) both the level of the exchange rate and the interest diﬀerential are highly persis-
tent.
2 Occasional UIP violations
In this section, we ﬁrst present the model in continuous time. Since the data are
sampled at discrete time intervals, however, it makes sense also to study the properties
of the implied discretized observations which we do in section 2.2.
2.1 Properties of the continuous-time model
Let r(t)b et h ei n s t a n t a n e o u sy i e l dd i ﬀerential between domestic and foreign-currency
denominated debt instruments with identical default risk and s(t) be the exchange
rate at time t. Then in continuous time UIP is the ﬁrst-order stochastic diﬀerential
equation
E[ ds(t)] = r(t)dt; (1) t
where E (·) is the expectation conditional on information available at instant t and t
ds(t)i st h ef o r w a r dd i ﬀerential of s(t). An explicit solution requires that the process
governing the interest diﬀerential be known. We adopt an assumption that is standard
in the literature on target zones and assume that r(t) follows a regulated Brownian
motion. The regulated Brownian motion generates high persistence in the interest
diﬀerential along with bounded variance. We show below that this simple model
adequately captures the features of interest diﬀerential presented in Table 1.
Interest differential dynamics
The interest diﬀerential is constrained to lie within the reﬂecting barriers (r;¯ r) where
r<¯ r.W h e nr(t) lies strictly within the bands, it evolves according to the Brownian
motion,
dr(t)=¾d z (t); (2) r
7where dz(t) is a standard Wiener process and ¾ is the weekly volatility in dr(t). To r
maintain expositional clarity, we assume that the reﬂecting barriers are symmetric
10 (r = −¯ r).
This is the Krugman (1992) target zone model with two modiﬁcations. First,
Krugman’s is based on a monetary model of the exchange rate which assumes UIP
but relies on several additional and empirically questionable relationships, such as
stable money demand functions and purchasing power parity. Second, in our model
the monetary authorities intervene by adjusting the interest diﬀerential within a band
instead of a set of vaguely deﬁned monetary fundamentals. Marginal interventions
occur whenever r(t)=¯ r or r(t)=−¯ r to prevent r(t) from exiting the bands. When
r(t) lies in the interior of the bands, we think of the authorities as focusing on domestic
objectives so that the interest diﬀerential, being subject to many diﬀerent sources of
11 shocks evolves randomly.
The idea that US-German exchange rate policy is guided by the maintenance
of the exchange rate within an informal target zone bears more than a shred of
empirical plausibility. Although exchange rate bands for the US dollar during the
post Bretton Woods era have never been formally established, both coordinated as
well as uncoordinated foreign exchange interventions are frequently engineered by the
major central banks, especially during times of unusual dollar strength or weakness.
The widespread practice of intervention at least suggests the existence of a set of
10Under band symmetry, the unconditional mean of r(t) is 0. The appendix shows how band
symmetry can be relaxed. Recent research has exploited similar nonlinear models to study exchange
rates [Michael, Nobay and Peel (1997), Kilian and Taylor (2001)]. Since interest diﬀerentials and
exchange rates are functionally related, it is natural to also consider nonlinear adjustment in the
interest diﬀerential. We note also that (2) is consistent with individual interest rate dynamics that
∗ ∗∗ ∗ ¯¯ evolve according to di(t)=¾d z(t)w h e ni ∈ [i;i]a n ddi (t)=¾d z(t)w h e ni ∈ [i; i], where 11 22 p
2 dz (t)=½dz (t)+ 1− ½d w (t)a n ddw(t)a n ddz (t) are independent standard Wiener processes. t 11 p
∗ 2 22 Then we have dr(t)=di(t) − di (t)=¾d z (t)w h e r e¾ =( ¾ − ½¾ )+ ¾ (1 − ½ ), and dz(t) rr 12 2
∗ ∗ ¯¯ is a standard Wiener process. If we set i = i =0 ,t h e nw eh a v e¯ r = i and r = −i:In any ﬁnite
∗ ∗ ¯ sample, however, we may not have very many realizations of the event {i = i ∩ i = i } or of the t t
∗∗ ¯ event {i = i ∩ i = i } so the standard error on the estimate of ¯ r is likely to be quite large. t t
11The idea that a monetary policy rule that depends on the exchange rate explains violations
of UIP was also examined by McCallum (1994). In his analysis, the authorities set the interest
diﬀerential in response to the currency depreciation rate.
812 informal bands.
Exchange rate solution
When r(t) lies within the bands, we obtain the family of solutions to (1)
3 r (t)
s(t)=A + Br(t)+ : (3) 2 3¾r
A and B are constant coeﬃcients to be determined by auxiliary conditions. A depends
on initial conditions and on currency units so without loss of generality, we set A =
0. If B is suﬃciently negative, the exchange rate will be decreasing in the interest
diﬀerential, with the result that a strong dollar is associated with high relative US
interest rates. Figure 1 shows solutions for alternative values of B. The nonlinear
manner in which the exchange rate function bends as the absolute magnitude of the
interest diﬀerential increases–is qualitatively similar to the Krugman (1992) S-shape
relationship between the exchanger a t ea n dt h e‘ f u n d a m e n t a l s . ’
Taking the total diﬀerential of (3) using Ito’s lemma, the instantaneous change in
the log exchange rate is
Ã!
2 r (t)
ds(t)=r(t)dt + B + ¾d z (t): (4) r 2 ¾r
Several properties of the model are more transparent in terms of the instantaneous
exchange rate return (4) than in levels form (3). First, UIP holds regardless of the
value of B as long as the interest diﬀerential lies strictly within the bands. This
is because dz(t) ∼ N(0;dt) so that taking expectations on both sides of (4), gives
13 E[ ds(t)] = r(t). Second, if the intervention rule were completely credible and t
12See Baillie and Osterberg (2000) for a narrative of Fed and Bundesbank intervention history over
the 80s and 90s. Since that time, the interventions have continued. On 22 Sept. 2000, the European
Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan (BOJ), Bank of Canada, and the
Bank of England engaged in a coordinated intervention to support the euro, the ECB engaged in
subsequent purchases of euros on 3 Nov. 2000, on 30 June, 1998 the BOJ intervened to support the
yen whereas on 3 April 2000, it intervened to support the dollar.
13We can entertain alternative intervention rules suggested in the target-zone literature. For
example, suppose participants believe that the authorities will intervene by setting the interest
9known to market participants, maintaining UIP at the instant of intervention requires
22 B = −¯ r= ¾. This is because at the instant of an intervention, say when the interest r
diﬀerential is at the upper band ¯ r, the distribution of dz(t) becomes right truncated at
zero with conditional mean E[dz(t)|r(t)=¯ r] ' −0:80. This restriction on B ensures
that the composite error term in (4) vanishes when r(t)=¯ r. Third, the instantaneous
22 2 2 conditional variance of the composite error term in (4) is (B + r (t)=¾ ) ¾d t .I t s rr
dependence on the interest diﬀerential causes it to vary over time thus giving rise to
ARCH eﬀects in exchange rate excess returns. This state-dependent nature of asset
returns in continuous-time equilibrium asset pricing models is a common feature of
such models [e.g., Merton (1990)] and gives a general theoretical basis for ARCH-
eﬀects in asset returns.
We will not, however, assume that market participants perfectly understand and
completely believe the intervention policy. Instead, we make the opposing extreme
22 assumption that participants do not anticipate interventions by allowing B 6= −¯ r= ¾. r
By doing so, we posit that market participants are unable to learn the central bank
14 rules so that interventions always take participants by surprise. Only central bankers
know the truth and the illegality of trading on such inside information prevents them
from exploiting the potentially huge proﬁt opportunities that they themselves create.
Thus, conditional on being at the upper band (say), market participants believe ex
diﬀerential to 0 when one of the bands is hit, as in Flood and Garber (1991). Then maintaining
2 ¯ r UIP during instants of intervention gives B = − ; where the coeﬃcient on r scaled down by 1=3. 2 3¾r
If the intervention rule lacks full credibility in the sense of Bertola-Caballero (1992), the coeﬃcient
is scaled down even further. In this setup, we begin with an initial band [−¯ r;¯ r]o fs i z eb =2 ¯ r.
Suppose that when the upper band ¯ r is touched, there is a probability p that the authorities will
realign instead of defending the initial band. 1 − p is the probability that they defend the initial
band. If realignment occurs, the authorities establish a new band where the old upper band ¯ r is
now the lower band and the new upper band is ¯ r + b a n dt h e yp l a c et h ei n t e r e s td i ﬀerential in the
middle of the new band. If defense takes place, the authorities place the interest diﬀerential back at
the midpoint of the band as in the Flood-Garber intervention. In this environment, maintenance of hi
2 (8p−1)¯ r UIP during instants of defense or realignments gives B =. 2 3¾r
14An alternative strategy for incorporating this idea would be to build a model of nonsystematic
interventions that are suﬃciently irregular that agents maintain diﬀuse priors over the interventions.
Dominguez (2003) provides a narrative account of Fed intervention policy and evidence on market
discovery of intervention episodes. See also Klein and Lewis (1993) who present a model in which
market participants update their prior probabilities about the interventions as Bayesian and learn
about the bands over time. An analysis of learning is beyond the scope of this paper.
10ante that UIP will hold whereas in truth, it is violated. The deviation from UIP at
this instant is Ã!
2 ¯ r
E[ds(t)|r(t)=¯ r] − ¯ rdt = − B + ¾ (0:8): (5) r 2 ¾r
When central bank interventions are stabilizing, it follows from (5) that in order for
deviations from UIP to go in the direction of the forward premium anomaly (where
the interest diﬀerential is negatively correlated with the future depreciation) it must
22 b et h ec a s et h a tB>−¯ r= ¾. r
2.2 Properties of discretized observations
Since the data are sampled at discrete points in time, it is useful to study a dis-
cretization the model to match the theory up with the observations. We begin by
integrating (4) to obtain the implied discrete-time depreciation
∙ ¸ ZZ Z 11 1 1 2 s(1) − s(0) = r(0) + ¾z (t)dt − z(0) + r (t)dz(t)+B¾ dz(t): (6) rr ¾ 00 0 r |{ z} |{ z} |{ z}
(c) (a) (b)
The terms labeled (a), (b), and (c) are separate components of the true error from
the regression of the future depreciation on the current interest diﬀerential. A further
decomposition of the discrete-time change gives
s(1) − s(0) = r(0)[1 + ²(1)] + v(1); (7)
where
ZZ 11 1
²(1) = [r(0) − 2¾z (0)] dz(t)+2 z(t)dz(t); (8) r ¾ 00 r |{ z} | { z }
(i)( ii)
ZZ Z 11 1
2 v(1) = ¾z(0) dz(t)+¾z (t)dt−2¾z (0) z(t)dz(t)( 9 ) rr r
00 0 |{ z} | { z } | { z }
(i)( iii)( ii)
ZZ 11
2 +¾z (t)dz(t)−¾z (0) + B¾ dz(t): rr r
00 | { z } |{ z}
(iv)( i)
11(7) is the ‘big-news’ representation suggested by Schotman et.al. (1997). They posit
the parametric representation of UIP s −s = r (1+² )+v where ² and v t+1 tt t +1 t+1 t+1 t+1
are conditionally zero-mean innovations. The multiplicative error r² is called “big tt +1
news” whereas the additive error v is regular news. They suggest that the forward t+1
premium anomaly may be a statistical artifact resulting from poor sampling properties
of the OLS estimator when the observations are generated by this representation and
15 where the interest diﬀerential is also drawn from a heavy-tailed distribution.
From (7)-(9) it can be seen that the distribution of the big news is leptokurtotic
and the ARCH eﬀects are preserved under discretization through seen by the depen-
22 dence of the conditional variance of the big news component E [r(0) ²(1) ] on r(0). 0
Several of the error components in (8) and (9) have more familiar representations. The
RR 11 2 term labeled (i)i s dz(t) ∼ N(0;1); the term labeled (ii)i s z(t)dz(t) ∼ Â (1)−1; 00 ³´ R 1 1 which is skewed, and the term labeled (iii)i s z(t)dt ∼ N 0; . The term labeled 0 3
R 1 2 (iv)i s z (t)dz(t) which is nonstandard. We investigate its properties by simula- 0
tion and ﬁnd it to be zero-meaned with a symmetrically leptokurtotic distribution
(coeﬃcient of excess kurtosis equal to 86.56).
When working with discrete time sampled (say weekly) data, we are interested in
regressing the weekly depreciation on the 1-week interest diﬀerential, R(0;1), and not
on the instantaneous return diﬀerential r(0). We appeal to the expectations hypothe-
RR 11 sis of the term structure of interest rates, R(0;1) = E ( r(u)du)=r(0) du = r(0), t 00
the discretized representation (6) corresponds to the regression run on the data even
though r(0) is the instantaneous yield.
15Big news is not the only ingredient in Schotman et.al. story of poor small sample properties
of OLS. They also assume that the interest diﬀerential is drawn from a leptokurtotic distribution.
In work along similar lines, Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) demonstrate that the inter 90-percentile
range of the OLS empirical distribution from regressing the exchange rate return on the interest
diﬀerential is (-5.14,10.9) when the conditional volatility in the interest diﬀerential follows their
calibrated fractionally integrated generalized ARCH process.
123 Simulated method of moments estimation
We ﬁrst estimate the parameters (¯ r;¾ ) of the interest rate processes using the sim- r
16 ulated method of moments (SMM). We begin by dividing each of the T weekly
observations into N subintervals, of length ± =1 =N ' dt, and use Euler’s method N
to approximate the continuous-time model
q
r = r + ¾² ± ; (10) jj −1 rj N
iid where j =1 ;:::;NT, ² ∼ N(0;1), and ¾ is the weekly standard deviation of the jr
instantaneous rate of return diﬀerential r(t). The parameters ¯ r and ¾ are chosen such r
that the implied moments generated from simulations of (10) minimize a measure of
quadratic distance between the set of simulated and sample moments. Using the 3
2 moments E(∆r;∆r; rr ); we obtain estimated values of ˆ ¾ =0 :576 (s.e.=0.070), tt t −1 r t
ˆ ¯ r =5 :632 (s.e.=0.643). The J-statistic for the chi-square test of the over identifying
restrictions is 0.008 which with one degree of freedom gives a p-value of 0.930 and is
not rejected by the data.
Because the occasional violations version of the model does not give guidance for
setting the parameter B, we use SMM estimates of B from the data. We obtain
an estimate of B by applying the Euler method to the exchange rate (3) using the
2 ˆ moments (E∆s;E∆s; E∆sr ). This gives B = 102 (s.e.=6.11). The positive tt t −1 t
point estimate is evidence against the hypothesis that UIP holds at intervention
points. Although carrying out classical hypothesis tests of the model are not our
primary interest, we note that tests of the over identifying restrictions are somewhat
unfavorable to the model (J=43, p-value=0.00).
4 Quantitative properties of the model
We now investigate the extent to which the model can quantitatively account for the
features of the data described in Section 1. We conduct a series of 5000 model simula-
16Lee and Ingram (1991), Duﬃe and Singleton (1993).
13Table 2: Statistical Properties of Calibrated Model (Percentiles of Monte Carlo Dis-
tributions from 5000 Replications of 1200 Weekly Observations).
Occasional Violations UIP
2.5% 50% 97.5% 2.5% 50% 97.5%
a= b= ¯ -4.020 -2.156 -1.565 0.670 1.105 2.104
a= asy-t -5.238 -4.156 -3.793 -1.732 0.399 2.511
2 b= LM: Â (1) 321.607 366.263 405.472 242.735 299.270 352.049
skewness -0.160 0.002 0.164 -0.227 -0.002 0.230
a= excess kurtosis -0.047 0.276 0.717 0.526 1.211 2.313
VR(2) 0.895 0.956 1.017 0.927 0.992 1.060
a= VR(12) 0.602 0.767 0.957 0.712 0.920 1.174
a= VR(24) 0.471 0.663 0.898 0.586 0.846 1.179
a= ¾ 69.858 74.912 79.798 34.503 39.912 44.673 ∆s
½ (1) -0.070 -0.004 0.064 -0.072 -0.007 0.061 ∆s
¾ 2.270 3.088 3.628 2.270 3.088 3.628 r
½ (1) 0.969 0.983 0.989 0.969 0.983 0.989 r
½ (12) 0.682 0.828 0.896 0.682 0.828 0.896 r
½ (24) 0.447 0.688 0.819 0.447 0.688 0.819 r
a= b= Note: —less than estimate from data. —greater than estimate from data.
tions with parameter values calibrated to our SMM estimates from US-German data.
Each simulation begins with a realization of the Euler—approximated continuous-time
interest diﬀerential and exchange rate with the weekly time interval divided into 84
subintervals. The initial value of the interest diﬀerential is drawn from the uniform
distribution with support [−¯ r;¯ r]. We then draw 1200 observations at weekly inter-
vals, to conform to the number of data points in the sample. These observations are
then employed to calculate the statistics that were used to characterize the data. The
results are contained in Tables 2 and 3.
Table 2 reveals the following. First, the model generates a pronounced forward
premium anomaly in which the entire inter-95-percentile range of the OLS slope co-
eﬃcient lies below the point estimate from the data. Second, as in the data, the
simulated observations from the occasional violations model exhibit strong ARCH
14Table 3: Volatility Properties. Median values and inter 90-percentile range
Occasional Violations UIP
2 LM Test for ARCH(1) Â (1) 366.26 299.27
GARCH(1,1) ± 0.019 0.156
2 h = ! + ±² + °h (5%:95%) (0.008:0.034) (0.074:0.288) t+1 t t
° 0.977 0.834
(5%:95%) (0.942:0.991) (0.724:0.910)
h = a + a |r | + va 634.2211 −423.3474 t 01 t−1 t 1
(445.3752: 838.0825) (−400.2462: −349.3086)
t-ratio 15.1162 −26.6304
(10.1836 : 209.3852) (−32.7553: −20.4963)
2 R 0.8316 0.8029
(0.7997:0.8567) (0.7590:0.8357)
Note: t-ratio constructed to test hypothesis that a =0 . 1
15eﬀects. The inter 95-percentile of the LM statistic distribution lies above the point
estimate from the data while the simulated error distribution is symmetric and ex-
hibits excess kurtosis. The implied log exchange is highly persistent although less so
than in the data, as seen from the quantiles of the variance ratio statistics. Third, the
model can match the volatility in the exchange rate return and the interest diﬀeren-
tial, which diﬀer from each other by a factor of 20. Finally, the regulated Brownian
motion matches the volatility and the persistence in the interest diﬀerential.
As a point of comparison, the table also displays the simulation results for the no
UIP violations speciﬁcation. Here, the median of the OLS slope coeﬃcient distribu-
tion lies slightly above 1, which goes in the opposite direction of the forward premium
anomaly. Another feature worth pointing out is that this model does not generate
suﬃcient volatility in the exchange rate return. The remaining aspects of the sim-
ulated observations shown in the table are quite similar to the occasional violations
model.
To examine the volatility properties of the model in more detail, Table 3 reports
selected percentiles of the GARCH(1,1) parameter estimates and coeﬃcient estimates
of the regression of the conditional variance on the absolute interest diﬀerential. In
regard to the GARCH(1,1) model, it can be seen that the estimated values of ± and °
from the data lie within the inter 95-percentile range of the statistical distributions.
In regard to the implied positive relationship between the exchange rate conditional
volatility and the absolute magnitude of the interest diﬀerential also conforms to that
17 found in the data.
Comparing the volatility properties to the no violations in UIP speciﬁcation, the
GARCH(1,1) patterns are also seen to conform to those found in the data but it
has the counterfactual property that the conditional variance of the exchange rate
is negatively related to the absolute size of the interest diﬀerential. This is because
that at the instant of intervention say at the upper band, UIP holds exactly with
17The heightened volatility associated with large interest diﬀerentials and intervention points pre-
dicted by the occasional violations model is consistent with empirical ﬁndings of Dominguez (1989),
Anderson et.al. (2002) and others who ﬁnd that heightened exchange rate volatility shortly following
central bank interventions.
16ds(t)=¯ rdt so that the conditional variance of the exchange rate collapses to zero
at this point. We note also that the ARCH eﬀects generated by the no violations
UIP model are less systematic in the sense that this speciﬁcation generates much
wider inter 95-percentile ranges for the GARCH parameter estimators than does the
occasional violations model
How frequently do these violations occur in producing these results? Based upon
the estimated model and a weekly sampling interval of the observations, the uncon-
ditional probability of touching either of the bands is 0.081. Over the course of a
sample of 23 years, this amounts to interventions in approximately 98 out of the total
1200 weekly observations. This is quite similar to the actual intervention record for
the Fed. Dominguez (2003) reports the record of Fed interventions from 1987 to 1995,
from which it can be inferred that the unconditional probability of Fed interventions
over that time period in the dollar—DM rate was 0.084.
5 Interventions and the forward premium anomaly
In this section, we present empirical results that focus on two predictions of the model.
The ﬁrst of these is that UIP is violated in the direction of the forward premium
anomaly only during times of intervention. The second is that foreign exchange
interventions are more likely to occur the larger is the magnitude of the interest
diﬀerential. We address these issues with data on Fed and Bundesbank interventions
18 in the dollar—DM market. These are daily indicators that show whether the Fed or
the Bundesbank had either bought or sold dollars.
We begin by examining whether the forward premium anomaly intensiﬁes during
interventions. First, we note that interventions occurred relatively more frequently
19 from the period 1977 to 1991. Simply splitting the sample at January 1992 and
18These are Reuters reports of central bank intervention. We thank Kathryn Dominguez for these
data.
19The number of days in which either the Fed or the Bundesbank was reported to have intervened
in the dollar-DM market was 173 (1977), 217 (1978), 217 (1979), 216 (1980), 139 (1981), 84 (1982),
130 (1983), 162 (1984), 55 (1985), 9 (1986),73 (1987),96 (1988), 110 (1989),34 (1990), 25 (1991), 8
(1992),5 (1993), 5 (1994), 8 (1995),0 (1996),0 (1997), 1 (1998).
17running the regression (1) gives an estimated slope coeﬃcient of -2.268 (s.e.=1.22)
for the early portion of the sample and an estimate of 0.249 (s.e.=1.41) for the latter
portion. This very coarse look at the data suggests that the forward premium anomaly
is found in the dollar-DM market during that portion of the sample when interventions
occurred most frequently.
To take a ﬁner look at the data, we deﬁne an intervention period as one in which
a central bank (either the Fed or the Bundesbank) has intervened within a window
of time around Friday, which is the day that the exchange rate and interest rate are
sampled. We then classify the observations as to whether or not they were drawn from
an intervention period and then estimate the regression (1) for each classiﬁcation. We
considered three intervention windows: i) a 5 day lead and lag window, ii) a 5 day
lead window, and iii) a 5 day lag window.
The results are shown in Table 4. Using the full sample, we see that in the ab-
sence of intervention, there is no forward premium anomaly. During non-intervention
periods using the lead and lag window deﬁnition, the slope coeﬃcient point estimate
slightly exceeds but is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1, whereas intervention periods,
ˆ the forward premium anomaly is present with ¯<0a n ds i g n i ﬁcantly less than 1. The
results are robust to the other two intervention window deﬁnitions. The sub sample
analysis tells a similar story. The forward premium anomaly is present when central
banks intervene. In the absence of intervention, a forward premium bias remains, but
the anomaly is absent.
Lastly, we examine the relationship between the likelihood of an intervention and
size of the interest diﬀerential. Consider a model where the central bank’s propensity
∗ to intervene y , depends on the magnitude of the interest diﬀerential, t
∗ y = µ + µ |r | + u: 01 tt t
∗ A central bank then intervenes y =1( o rd o e sn o ty =0 )i fy exceeds a threshold tt t
of 0, ⎧
⎪ ∗ ⎨ 1i fy> 0 t y = t ⎪ ⎩ 0o . w .
18Table 4: The Forward Premium Anomaly During Normal and Intervention Periods
Interventions No Interventions
Lead&Lag Lead Lag Lead&Lag Lead Lag
Sample: 1977-1998
Observations 632 553 552 520 599 600
Slope -1.591 -2.183 -2.346 1.195 1.130 1.601
t-ratio -2.110 -2.255 -2.380 0.147 0.111 0.506
Sample: 1977-1991
Observations 592 531 530 194 255 256
Slope -2.179 -2.788 -2.340 0.242 0.363 0.894
t-ratio -2.112 -2.252 -2.042 -0.317 -0.329 -0.053
Sample: 1992-1998
Observations 40 22 22 326 344 344
Slope -4.198 -7.630 -3.896 0.711 0.652 0.671
t-ratio -1.377 -2.011 -0.879 -0.184 -0.231 -0.220
Note: t-ratio constructed to test the hypothesis that slope equals 1.
ˆˆ Fitting a probit to this model gives µ = −0:726;(t = −9:056) and µ =0 :208;(t = 01
9:500). That the likelihood of central bank interventions is found to increase with
the size of the interest diﬀerential is consistent with the idea that the exchange rate
lies relatively far from the central banks target rate during periods of large absolute
interest diﬀerentials and that central banks are more likely to intervene during these
times with the dual objective of guiding the exchange rate towards its target value
20 and to reduce market volatility.
6 Conclusion
This paper was motivated in part by the long-standing diﬃculty encountered by
research in the area to establish that measured deviations from UIP vary systemati-
cally with economic fundamentals in ways predicted by standard asset pricing theory.
20Baillie and Osterberg (2000) report that the magnitude of deviations from UIP increase during
intervention periods, but they do not directly address the eﬀect on the forward premium anomaly.
Baillie and Osterberg (1997a,b) and Dominguez (1989) ﬁnd evidence that interventions are in part
motivated to reduce market volatility.
19As an alternative, we have put forth a simple model in which the forward premium
anomaly emerges as a result of unanticipated central bank interventions in the foreign
exchange market. In this model, the violations to UIP do not reﬂect unexploited proﬁt
opportunities or systematic risk. The model is able to generate a foreign premium
anomaly that is quantitatively reasonable in size. In addition, it is able to match or
reasonably approximate many other notable features of the data. Further support for
the model is obtained from an analysis of Fed and Bundesbank interventions which
ﬁnds that the forward premium anomaly intensiﬁes during periods in which central
banks are intervening.
I tm i g h tb ea r g u e dt h a tt h em o d e lw ep r e s e n ti sap o o rc a n d i d a t ef o rp r o v i d i n g
a literal description of the foreign exchange market due to its highly stylized nature.
There are no good reasons other than tractability for the many assumptions that we
made, such as the purely unanticipated nature of the interventions their unlearnabil-
ity, that interventions only occur at the margins of this ﬁxed but informal exchange
rate band. The model might best be viewed as a parable for a more realistic en-
vironment in which the interest diﬀerential may be subject to occasional shifts into
an evolving menu of regimes. Market participants in this environment, although at-
tempting to learn about the underlying rules, are only able to do so exceptionally
slowly.
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23Figure 1: Nonlinear relation between log exchange rate and interest diﬀerential: Plots

















































































































A.1 Exchange rate solution
We ﬁrst derive the solution in the text following Krugman’s (1992) use of the method
of undetermined coeﬃcients. We guess that the solution takes the form,
s(t)=G[r(t)]; (A.1)
where G(·) is a time-invariant continuous and twice diﬀerentiable function of r.U s i n g
Ito’s lemma to take the total diﬀerential of (A.1) gives
1 00 0 2 ds(t)=G [r(t)]dr(t)+ G [r(t)][dr(t)] (A.2)
2
00 0 22 where G = dG(r)=dr and G = dG (r)=dr :
Derivation of eq.(3). If the interest diﬀerential evolves according to (2), then
22 dr(t)=¾d z (t)a n ddr(t)= ¾d t . Upon substitution into (A.2), we get r r
2 ¾r 00 0 ds(t)=G [r(t)]¾d z (t)+ G [r(t)]dt (A.3) r 2
Now take expectations of both sides of (A.3) conditional on information known at
instant t,
2 ¾r 00 E[ ds(t)] = G [r(t)]dt = r(t)dt (A.4) t 2
where the second equality is obtained by UIP. Now we seek to solve the diﬀerential
equation,
2 ¾r 00 G [r(t)] = r(t) (A.5)
2
Let the solution to the homogeneous part of (A.5) be G . This solution must satisfy h
00 G =0a n di ss a t i s ﬁed by setting G = A + Br. Next, we guess that the solution h h
3 0 2 00 to the nonhomogeneous part be G = kr .T h e n G =3 kr ;G =6 kr.U p o n n nn
2 substitution into (A.5), we obtain k =1 =3¾ . The general solution is therefore r
32 s(t)=G + G = A + Br+ r= (3¾ ), which is eq.(3). k hn r
22 Derivation of restriction B = −¯ r= ¾ under the no UIP violations speciﬁcation. r
Here, we exploit knowledge of behavior at the bands to determine B. Due to the
symmetric nature of the bands, we need only examine behavior at one of the bands.
0 22 Suppose that r(t) attains the upper band ¯ r.A tt h a ti n s t a n t ,G [¯ r]=0=B +¯ r= ¾ r
22 and solving yields B = −(¯ r= ¾). k r
Derivation of B for Flood-Garber interventions in footnote 9. As in the abofe deriva-
25tion for B under the marginal intervention rule, the solution to the nonhomogenous
32 part of the diﬀerential equation is given by G = r= (3¾ ). A general guess solution n r
can be written explicitly in terms of the bands as,
3 r
G(r|¯ r)=A ++ B(r − ¯ r)+C(r +¯ r) (A.6) 2 3¾r
Now suppose the upper band is hit at the instant t , r(t )=¯ r, it follows that 00
3 ¯ r
s(t )=A ++ 2 C¯ r: (A.7) 0 2 3¾r
At the next instant, the interest diﬀerential is set to 0. Since these actions are known
with certainty, we have,
s(t + dt)=Es(t + dt)=G(0|¯ r)=A +( C − B)¯ r: (A.8) 0 t 0
Ruling out arbitrage proﬁts requires that s(t + dt)=s(t ). Thus equating (A.7) 00
22 and (A.8) gives (B + C)=−¯ r= (3¾ ). Due to the symmetry of the bands, we have r
22 B = C = −¯ r= (6¾ ). Substituting back into (A.6) gives, r
23 ¯ rr
G(r|¯ r)=A − r + (A.9) 22 3¾ 3¾ rr
k
Derivation of B for Bertola-Caballero interventions in footnote 9.A g a i n , b e g i n b y
writing the guess solution explicitly in terms of the bands,
3 r (t)
G(r|¯ r)=A ++ B(r − ¯ r)+C(r − r) (A.10) 2 3¾r
where r = −¯ r, and where we have already made use of the solution to the nonhomo-
geneous part of the diﬀerential equation. Under symmetric intervention points, we
know that B = C. Let the bandwidth be b =¯ r − r =2 ¯ r. It follows that,
B(r − ¯ r)+C(r − r)=B(r − ¯ r + r − r)
= B[2(r − ¯ r)+b]
which we can use to rewrite (A.10) as,
3 r (t)
G(r|r;¯ r)=A ++ 2 Br (A.11) 2 3¾r
26Now suppose that the upper band ¯ r is attained at instant t .T h e n 0
3 ¯ r
s(t )=G(¯ r|r;¯ r)=A ++ Bb (A.12) 0 2 3¾r
At the next instant, the authorities revalue with probability p to G(¯ r+(b=2)|¯ r;¯ r+b)=
32 A +(¯ r +( b=2)) =(3¾ ) or defend with probability 1 − p by setting the exchange rate r
32 to G(¯ r − (b=2)|r;¯ r)=A +(¯ r − (b=2)) =(3¾ ). That is, r
(
32 A +(¯ r +( b=2)) =3¾ w.p. p r s(t + dt) = (A.13) 0 32 A +(¯ r − (b=2)) =(3¾ )w . p . ( 1 − p) r
To rule out expected arbitrage proﬁts, we require s(t )=E[ s(t +dt)] from which it 0 t 0
follows that,
33 3 ¯ r (¯ r +( b=2)) (¯ r − (b=2))
A ++ Bb = A + p +( 1− p) : (A.14) 22 2 3¾ 3¾ 3¾ rr r
Solving (A.14) for B gives,
33 3 2 p(¯ r +( b=2)) + (1 − p)(¯ r − (b=2)) − ¯ r ¯ r
B == ( 8 p − 1) (A.15) 22 3b¾ 6¾ rr
where the second equality follows from the symmetry conditions. k
Derivation of (6). We begin with (4) which, for convenience, we reproduce here as
Ã!
2 r (t)
ds(t)=r(t)dt + B + ¾d z (t): r 2 ¾r
Integration gives,
Z 1
s(1) − s(0) = ds(t)
0 ZZ Z 11 1 1 2 = r(t)dt+ r (t)dz(t)+B¾ dz(t) (A.16) r ¾ 00 0 r |{ z} | { z } |{ z}
(a)( c) (b)
Since ZZ tt
r(t) − r(0) = dr(u)=¾d z (u)=¾ [z(t) − z(0)]; (A.17) rr
00
it follows that ZZ 11
(a)= r(t)dt = r(0) + ¾z (t)dt − ¾z (0): rr
00
27Next, squaring the interest diﬀerential using (A.17) gives
22 2 22 r (t)=r (0) + ¾ [z (t)+z (0) − 2z(0)z(t)] + 2r(0)¾ [z(t) − z(0)] (A.18) r r
Integrating (A.18) with respect to dz(t)g i v e s ,
ZZ Z 11 1 11 22 2 2 (b)= r (t)dz(t)= {r (0) dz(t)+¾z (t)dz(t) r ¾¾ 00 0 rr ZZ 11
22 2 +¾z(0) dz(t) − 2¾z (0) z(t)dz(t) rr
00 ZZ 11
+2r(0)¾z (t)dz(t) − 2r(0)z(0)¾d z (t)} rr
00 ZZ 11 1 2 =[ r(0) − ¾z (0)] dz(t)+2 [ r(0) − ¾z (0)] z(t)dz(t) rr ¾ 00 r Z 1
2 +¾z (t)dz(t) r
0
R 1 Now for part (c), we simply note that B¾ dz(t)=B¾ [z(1)−z(0)]. Substitute rr 0
these expressions back into (A.16) to get
ZZ 11 1 2 s(1) − s(0) = r(0) + ¾z (t)dt − ¾z (0) + [r(0) − ¾z (0)] dz(t) rr r ¾ 00 r ZZ Z 11 1
2 +2[r(0) − ¾z (0)] z(t)dz(t)+¾z (t)dz(t)+B¾ dz(t) rr r
00 0
≡ r(0) + ´(1)
Decomposing ´(1) into terms that depend on r(0) and those that do not gives
´(1) = r(0)²(1) + v(1) where ²(1) is given by (8) and v(1) is given by (9). k
Asymmetric Bands. The symmetric band assumption is not key and can be relaxed.
Here, we derive the exchange rate solution when r = −®¯ r. As above, the solution to
32 the nonhomogeneous part of the diﬀerential equation is G = r= (3¾ ). We write the n r
general guess solution explicitly in terms as
3 r (t)
s(t)=G(r|r;¯ r)=A ++ B[¯ r + r(t)=®]+C[r + ®r(t)]: (A.19) 2 3¾r
At r(t)=¯ r,
3 ¯ r (t)
G(¯ r|r;¯ r)=A ++ B[¯ r +¯ r=®]; (A.20) 2 3¾r
and ∙ ¸ 1+® ¯ r 0 G (¯ r|r;¯ r)=0=B + ; (A.21) 2 ®¾ r
28which gives
∙ ¸ 2 ® ¯ r
B = − : (A.22) 2 1+®¾ r
Similarly, at r(t)=r,
3 r
G(r|r;¯ r)=A ++ C[r + ®r]; (A.23) 2 3¾r
and
2 r 0 G (r|r;¯ r)=0=C(1 + ®) + (A.24) 2 ¾r
which gives, "# ∙ ¸ 22 2 1 r® ¯ r
C = − = − = −®B (A.25) 22 1+®¾ 1+®¾ rr
A.2 Simulated method of moments estimation
Let the simulated observations be denoted with a ‘tilde.’ For the discretized regulated
Brownian motion we divided each of the T = 1200 weekly time periods into N =1 4
subintervals. Experimentation using N =7a n dN = 21 subintervals produced little
diﬀerences in the results. Setting ± =( 1 =N) ' dt; we simulate sequences of (10) by N
q
˜ r =˜ r + ¾² ± (A.26) jj −1 rj N
iid where ² ∼ N(0;1) and j ⎧
⎪ r if ˜ r< r t−1 ⎨
˜ r if r ≤ ˜ r ≤ ¯ r ˜ r = jj j ⎪ ⎩ ¯ r if ˜ r> ¯ r t−1
for j =1 ;:::;NMT. The observations were then re-sampled at weekly intervals
giving us a sequence of MT weekly observations (we use M = 30).
SMM estimation of this model proceeds as follows. Let ¯ be the vector of pa-
0 rameters to be estimated, r =( r ;r ;:::;r ) denote the collection of the actual 12 T
M time-series observations, and {˜ r (¯)} be the computer simulated time-series of i i=1
0 length M which we generate according to (A.26). ˜ r (¯)=( ˜ r (¯); ˜ r (¯);:::;˜ r (¯)) 12 M
denotes the collection of these M observations. To estimate ¾ and ¯ r by matching r
2 E(∆r );E(∆r ) ; and E(rr ), we let the vector function of the data from which tt t t −1
2 0 to simulate the moments be h(r )=( r;r;rr ) and the vector of sample mo- tt t t −1 t PT 1 ments be H (r)= h(r ). The corresponding vector of simulated moments is t T t=1 T PM 1 H (˜ r(¯)) = h(˜ r (¯)), where the length of the simulated series is M.N o wl e t i M i=1 M PT 1 0 ˆ u = h(r )−H (r) be the deviation of h from its mean, Ω = uu be the sam- t 0 tT t t=1 t T PT 1 0 ˆ ple short-run variance of u ,a n dΩ = uu be the sample cross-covariance j tt t=1 t−j T
29P j+1 m 1 0 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ matrix of u , W = Ω +( 1 − )(Ω + Ω ) is the Newey and West (1987) T 0 j t j=1 j TT
estimate of the long-run covariance matrix of u . t
If we let g (¯)=H (r) − H (˜ r(¯)) be the deviation of the sample moments TM T;M
ˆ from the simulated moments, then the SMM estimator, ¯ ,i st h a tv a l u eo f¯ that
S
minimizes the quadratic distance between the simulated moments and the sample
moments hi
0 −1 g (¯) W g (¯); (A.27) T;M T;M T;M
h³ ´ i
T where W =1 + W and is asymptotically normally distributed with T;M T M
√ D ˆ T(¯ − ¯) → N(0;V ); S S
hh ³ ´i i −1 E@h[˜ q (¯)] j T 0 as T and M →∞where V = B 1+ WB and B =. S M@ ¯
We estimated ¯ r and ¾ by doing a grid search over ¯ r ∈ [2:0;15:0] and minimizing r
with respect to ¾ for each candidate value of ¯ r. r
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